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 In this paper we compare Brazil’s and China’s regional integration/cooperation strategies. Brazil and China are two rising powers on the global arena with a high impact on their respective regions. The view taken in the analysis is not that regional integration is important in itself, instead, our analysis seeks to explain the kind of regionalism promoted by Brazil and China in their respective role in shaping and directing regional integration/cooperation. Through the comparative analysis of their role in regional integration, we will be able to understand not only their international political strategies of emphasizing regionalism and South-South relations but also the strategies of national development of the two states as well as their aim of changing the balance of power in the world system and gaining a more prominent position on the world stage in the current era of globalization and transnational capitalism.
Our comparative analysis of the two countries’ international political strategies and the particular weight given to regionalism and South-South relations highlights the significance of the wider international context, own development situations as well as the patterns of international economic insertion for the chosen strategies. 
The paper starts out with an analysis of regional integration in Latin America and Brazil’s strategies followed by an analysis of regional integration in East Asia and China’s strategies. The conclusion sums up the main similarities and differences between the two countries and the two regions.
 
Regional Integration in Latin America
In the following, I briefly discuss the history and unique characteristics of regional integration in Latin America. Then I go on to analyze the role of regional integration in Brazil’s development strategy as part of a more comprehensive strategy of South-South cooperation aimed at changing the global balance of power.

Historical background
The history of Latin American regional integration or regionalism is one of great instability. It is hardly a success story, but it still cannot be discarded in terms of its future potential to contribute to the region’s economic development and position on the international political scene. 
After independence from Spain in the early 19th century there were attempts at pursuing an ambitious strategy of political unification of Spanish America. This attempt was unsuccessful as Spanish America became divided into a number of countries based on the political demarcations in place during the colonial period. 
Regional integration in Latin America did not emerge as a significant issue until the 1950s, and at this point the aims of regional integration were purely of an economic character and with the emphasis on free trade. In 1960, LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Agreement) was established between Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Later Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela joined. LAFTA was inspired by ideas developed in the Economic Commission for Latin America that saw broader regional markets provided by regional free trade as a way to promote national industrialization, and thus economic development, in participant countries (Christensen, 2007a: 3).  At the outset, there was very little mutual trade between the member countries due to the low degree of economic complementation, which relates to common colonial histories that produced relatively similar economic structures and a tendency for “vertical trade” between the prior colonies and the industrialized countries. Generally speaking, Latin America tended to export primary goods to the industrialized countries and to import industrial goods from them. The low degree of interdependence goes against the expectations of the liberal intergovernmentalist theory of regional integration that assumes that economic interdependence is a strong precondition for integration, and the main theories of regional integration are insufficient to explain regional integration in Latin America (Malamud, 2004: 135-145). 
Apart from LAFTA, two other regional integration initiatives came into being in the 1960s, namely the CACM (Central American Common Market) in 1960 and the Andes Pact in 1969. Economic interdependence was also quite low at the outset in both of these cases. This was particularly the case of the Andes Pact where intra-regional trade solely constituted 1.2 % of total foreign trade at the outset (Mattli, 1999: 148). In the case of CACM, intra-regional trade constituted 6.0% at the outset (ibid: 150-152). In the case of LAFTA, intra-regional trade was somewhat higher, but still low. The highest degree of mutual trade was found between the most industrially developed South American neighboring countries of LAFTA, namely Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Their mutual trade reached a peak of 12.2 % in 1953 (Furtado, 1972: 197), but then fell back. Thus, the initiative of regional integration in the case of LAFTA was actually taken at a time of falling regional economic interdependence, something that goes against the expectations of dominant theories of regional integration such as neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism.. 
In the analysis of Latin American regional integration/cooperation, the theoretical perspective that seems most useful to this author is a combination of inter-governmentalism with its emphasis on changing preferences of member states, along with what Andrew Hurrell (1995: 46-58) calls systemic theories of regional integration. The most useful here is a combination of neo-realism and theories that emphasize the importance of international market pressures found in literature on economic interdependence and globalization. Walter Mattli’s distinction between what he calls the “first integrative move” and the “second integrative move” is also useful. He describes the second integrative move as a self-protective move of states in response to the emergence of regional integration schemes elsewhere (Mattli, 1999). LAFTA and CACM can therefore be categorized as belonging to the second integrative move, while the Andes Pact was a response by the Andes countries to what they perceived as unfair asymmetric outcomes from LAFTA. A particularity of CACM was that the Cuban revolution was a contributing factor behind its establishment and that CACM it was assisted by the United States with financial support (Mattli, 1999: 142-150). US support of CACM should be understood in the context of the Cold War as a way in which the US sought to help stabilize the region and maintain good relations to it. Thus, CACM can be seen as a geo-politically assisted regional integration project through which the United States sought to cement its position as regional hegemon.
However, LAFTA, CACM and the Andean Common Market all ran into problems of economic and political instability. A war broke out between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969 and disarticulated the regional project provoking a fall in the level of interdependence. Intra-regional trade stayed very low in the Andean Common Market and in spite of the intricate institutional set-up of the region, market actors generally were not interested in the scheme (Mattli, 1999: 148). The level of interdependence in the whole region fell drastically in the early 1980s (Hurrell, 1995: 251) putting a stop to the growing interdependence of the two most developed industrial nations in South America, Argentina and Brazil, that had taken place in the 1970s (Hurrell, 1995: 256). Thus, the spill-over effects experienced in the European regional integration process which the neo-functionalist theory emphasizes as central to processes of regional integration (Mattli, 1999) did not occur in this first generation of Latin American regional integration that is typically categorized as examples of “old regionalism” because they co-existed with national strategies of import substitution and industrialization (ISI) in the member states.

Recognizing the lack of success LAFTA was reorganized as LAIA (Latin American Integration Agreement) in 1980, and in spite of the fall in interdependence between Argentina and Brazil, these two countries started building closer ties with the advent of democratization in both countries (Hurrell, 1995: 254). It is noteworthy that this is yet one more example of a regional integration project starting during a period of weakened regional interdependence as a response to a common sense of external threat, in this case provoked by the foreign debt crisis. Argentina and Brazil initially agreed on a number of intra-industrial sector agreements. However the foreign debt crisis had not been defeated and both countries were hit by a serious financial crisis at the end of the 1990s that paved the way for a reorientation of the regional scheme and an extension of the scheme that with the inclusion of Paraguay and Uruguay led to the establishment of Mercosur in 1991 (Christensen, 2007a). Mercosur took a neo-liberal market orientation that emphasized economic openness and privatizations of state companies as well as a relatively quick reduction in intra-regional trade tariffs, along with external tariffs generally. Therefore, Mercosur can be described as an example of “open regionalism” or “open integration”. Mercosur’s redirection responded to two important contextual factors, namely the fall of the Soviet block with the consequent uni-polar world order led by the United States, and an intensification of the process of economic globalization. Regional integration was a response to this and to the construction of a free trade agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, the NAFTA, and the idea of U.S. president George Bush of a hemispheric free trade agreement that would expand the reach of NAFTA to all of Latin America with the exception of communist Cuba. Responding to this initiative and the pro-liberal international context, the Andean Common Market and the CACM (that changed names to CAFTA) got a new start that followed the neo-liberal approach also pursued by Mercosur (Hurrell, 1995). It should be stressed that this new wave of open regionalism to a very large extent thus responded to contextual systemic world developments as well as to lingering development crisis conditions in Latin America.  
This new development led to strong increases in inter-dependence in all of the Latin American sub-regions just mentioned. In the case of Mercosur, regional economic interdependence was relatively low at the outset with intra-regional exports to the tune of 4,127 billion US $ accounting for just 8.9 % of total exports of the member countries in 1990 (CEPAL, 2002: 10). At the end of 1991, intra-regional exports contributed with 11.11 % of total exports (INTAL, 1997: 8). There was a large difference in the degree of interdependence between the four member countries, however. In terms of economic size, Brazil was by far the dominant country contributing with 65.23 % of regional GDP. Argentina’s economy was the second biggest and contributed with 32.40 % of regional GDP, while Paraguay contributed with 1.05 % and Uruguay with 1.90 %. In terms of intra-regional trade, the scale was inverted with the smallest countries more dependent on regional trade than the bigger countries. In Brazil’s case, 7.30 % went to the regional partners in 1991, while 16.32 % of Argentina’s exports, 35.19 % of Paraguay’s exports and 35.42 % of Uruguay’s exports were intra-regional (INTAL, 1997: 8). This draws a picture of a very asymmetrical region with Brazil as the dominant power, and the smaller countries depending more on the regional export market than Brazil. Intra-regional trade expanded strongly between 1991 and 1997 when intra-regional exports made up 24.7 % of total exports (Cepal, 2002: 10). Exports to Mercosur increased in significance for all member countries, but particularly so for the three smallest countries. In terms of trade composition, Brazil’s exports were largely industrial goods whereas Paraguay and Uruguay depended more on primary goods, whereas Argentina took an intermediate position (Christensen, 2007a: 10). Apparently, regional integration was successful as it seemed to contribute to economic growth and growing regional interdependence. However, Mercosur was hit by economic instability in the late 1990s and intra-regional trade fell drastically between 1998 and 2002. Intra-Mercosur exports were US$ 20,322 billion in 1998 and fell to US$ 10.197 billion in 2002. This meant that the share of exports going to Mercosur in total regional exports fell from 25.3 % to 11.4 % in the period (Cepal, 2007: 137). This created a crisis in the region and a growing tendency towards the breaking of intra-regional trade rules as particularly Argentina and Uruguay’s policies focused on national development concerns rather than the observance of regional trade rules. The feeling spread amongst the three smallest countries that Mercosur wasn’t working in a way that was fair for them. The perception that development outcomes were asymmetric and to the benefit of Brazil, or sometimes Brazil and Argentina from the perspective of Uruguay and Paraguay, led to the questioning of the functioning of Mercosur and to a new emphasis on dealing with asymmetrical outcomes (Giordano, Moreira and Quevedo, 2003; Christensen, 2007a).
However, the economic crisis experienced by the Mercosur countries had a significant impact of the posture of its two largest members towards the FTAA proposed by the United States. The FTAA was scrapped by Argentina and Brazil as they believed that it would be dangerous for them to join a US-led block with the set of rules promoted by the United States in NAFTA, since they believed that a regional block based on these rules would endanger industrial and socio-economic development in Argentina and Brazil and that it would endanger their sovereignty. In this way the commitment of Argentina to Mercosur as a significant component of their development strategy became stronger than in the 1990s, where Argentina had been quite interested in the FTAA process and closer relations to the United States (Bernal-Meza, 1999: 163). 
Regional economic relations started improving again in 2003 as the member countries saw a tendency towards renewed economic growth. Intra-regional trade started expanding again. Intra-regional trade also expanded significantly at the scale of South America and Latin America. This development was helped along by renewed economic growth in the region and high international prices for natural resources which dominate the export profile of most of the countries in the region. Trading patterns differ strongly between the countries, though. Thus, Central American countries and Mexico have developed very high levels of economic interdependence with particularly the United States, whereas South America differs from this picture. Particularly countries in the Southern and Atlantic part of South America have very diversified export structures with Asia, Latin America and Europe as major trade partners. Thus, the US market is just one important market of many for these countries. Northern South American countries as Colombia, Venezuela and Peru are in between this pattern and the pattern seen in Mexico and Central America.
In terms of regional FDI, particularly the biggest industrial countries Mexico and Brazil, but also Chile receive significant FDI from the rest of the world. Chile and Brazil are furthermore becoming ever more significant contributors of intra-regional FDI. According to the Brazilian Confederation of Industry CNI (2007), South America has therefore gained strategic importance for the Brazilian industrial sector. Brazil invests heavily in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela but is also active in the rest of the continent, not the least in the area of energy and infrastructural investments. Chile invests heavily in countries such as Argentina and Peru. Thus, South America (and Mexico) has developed new expansionary business groups, the so-called Trans-latinas and there is a growing tendency towards regional interdependence in South America, although the degree of interdependence differs strongly between individual countries. Similarly, the pattern of intra-regional trade differs significantly with the most developed Southern Cone countries performing strongly in terms of industrial exports and the less developed Andean countries (excluding in part Colombia) depending more on energy exports and other primary products. This potentially, but not necessarily, makes regional economic integration more beneficial for the more industrially developed countries in South America. With regard to the Central American countries and Mexico these are very dependent on the North American market. In this way, it can be argued that the region should be seen as broken into two parts with very different characteristics and very different patterns of international economic insertion. These patterns have geo-political significance and they have significance in terms of the development strategies developed in the two regions. Mexico and Central America are clearly in a very strong relation of dependence on the US market, whereas the situation is less defined in South America. In the remainder of the analysis of regional integration in Latin America, I will therefore analyze Brazil’s role in South America and its strategies towards the region. I will discuss the importance of regional integration in Brazil’s development strategy as well as the importance of wider South-South links for Brazil in its development strategy and in its geo-political strategy.      

Brazil’s Development Strategies in Regional Integration
Brazil has been interested in regional integration in Latin America since the establishment of LAFTA in 1960, but as we have seen it has been hard to find a successful approach that satisfied regional partners. After the apparently successful attempt with Mercosur’s strategy of “open integration” in most of the 1990s, Mercosur entered a crisis at the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, despite this crisis 72 % of the ‘Brazilian foreign policy community’, a concept that refers to those people who either participate directly in or contribute significantly to the formation of public opinion with regard to Brazil’s foreign relations, according to an investigation by Souza (2002: 5) continued believing in 2000-2001 that Brazil needed Mercosur to strengthen its negotiation capacity in relation to the United States and the EU, while 91 % saw Mercosur as beneficial for Brazil (Souza, 2002: 53). However 52 % of the respondents in Souza’s study preferred to sew a widening of regionalism to the South American level compared to the 28 % of respondents who preferred a deepening of Mercosur (Souza, 2002: 58). The last segment of the Brazil analysis discusses different aspects of the strategies pursued by Brazil in this respect from the instalment of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva as president in 2003.

Pushing regional economic relations
The Brazilian government of Lula has put great emphasis on South American economic relations and South American regional integration more generally in its political rhetoric. In his first speech as president, Lula emphasized this point by announcing (Lula, 2003) that:

“The greatest priority of our foreign policy during my government will be the building of a politically stable, prosperous and united South America, founded upon the ideals of democracy and social justice. To this end, decisive action is required to vitalize Mercosur…” 
 
In practice, Brazil has pursued a strategy of diversification of its international economic relations from 2003 with an emphasis on trade with other developing countries particularly in Asia (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007). However, this emphasis has not really been at the expense of pushing regional economic relations at the level of Mercosur and South America. Thus, already in 2003, Mercosur entered regional free trade agreements with the Andean countries, a move that led to the creation of the South American Community of Nations with the membership of all South American states in 2004 (Mercadante, 2006). This initiative aimed both at promoting mutual trade in the region and at promoting the physical integration of South America along with a strengthened cooperation in the energy sector, areas where FDI was a key component. In a report from 2007, the Brazilian National Confederation of Industry, CNI (2007: 9-11) underlines that South America has strategic sector for the Brazilian industrial sector both due to the high component of manufacturing in the rapidly growing exports to the region as well as due to the enormous growth in Brazilian FDI in the region.  
This feeling is widely shared amongst Brazilian elites. For instance, in Souza’s second study of the Brazilian foreign policy community it is clear that South America is at the top of its foreign policy priorities (2008: 55). The development of regional economic relations during this period show that Latin America and the Caribbean with 25.9 % of total exports had become the biggest export market for Brazil by 2008 and that a great majority of exports were to be found in the manufacturing sector (BCB, 2009: 110-113). The great majority of Brazil’s exports to this overall reaching is directed at South American markets. The share of Mercosur is 11 %, which shows that Mercosur’s participation in Brazilian exports has doubled from its low point in 2002 (BCB, 2003: 130-133; BCB, 2009: 110-113). Brazil’s flexible attitude towards its Mercosurean partners is likely to have contributed positively to this renewed export growth. 
Thus, Brazil has agreed to Argentina’s wish to introduce a mechanism in Mercosur’s system of rules that makes it possible for Argentina (and the other members) to introduce temporary barriers to sudden surges in imports from other regional members that are deemed to threaten a certain national economic sector or branch. Similarly, a regional structural fund inspired by EU’s structural funds has been instated in Mercosur as a sign of the goodwill of the leading economies towards the smaller economies that have criticized asymmetries in the Mercosur and what they see as an unfair distribution of gains from regional integration (Christensen, 2007b). In fact, from the perspective of the Brazilian foreign ministry, one of the biggest threats to the success of regional integration at the level of both Mercosur and South America is that the processes are seen as producing asymmetrical results that benefit the biggest members, notably Brazil. In order to avoid that this perception becomes too strong and gets in the way of regional cooperation, the Brazilian government has introduced policies that aim at increasing Brazilian imports for the region, and the national development bank BNDES has supported Brazilian investments in the region, as many South American countries are very interested in Brazilian investments to boost economic activity (Christensen, 2007b). 
Comparing these policies with the Venezuelan government’s foreign “aid” oriented policies in Latin America, Sean Burghes (2007) argues that the Brazilian approach is likely to be the most attractive for regional partners and thus support growing Brazilian influence in the region. It could be argued that this can be seen as an indirect form of Brazilian leadership in the region, although analysts of regional integration in South America widely believe that Brazil is not really providing the needed leadership, particularly not at the level of Mercosur, and that the explanation is that in spite of its strong rhetoric on the centrality of regional integration, actions show that the Brazilian government (as well as economic elites) are more interested in other markets and do not want Brazil to be held back by supra-national rules at the regional level. 

Engine of economic growth and economic complementarities between Brazil and the region
As the dominant economy by far, the Brazilian economy makes up around 50 % of South American GDP (Christensen, 2007b), Brazil plays a significant role as an engine of economic growth in the region. However, strong economic asymmetries (Giordano, Moreira and Quevedo, 2003) and a shortfall of economic complementarities weaken Brazil in this role. Brazil’s trade surplus in the region is extraordinarily large, particularly in relation to non-Mercosur countries (BCB, 2009). The reason for this is largely structural. Brazil is by far the strongest industrial economy, although Chile and Colombia are also doing relatively well in this area, and is able to export great quantities of industrial goods to the region, whereas the less industrially developed countries have less to offer Brazil that it doesn’t produce as efficiently itself. This means that Brazil imports relatively little from the smaller South American countries. The situation is somewhat better between Brazil and the more industrially developed countries in the region, particularly Argentina and Chile. Conscious of how this can get in the way in Brazil’s desire of uniting South America and gaining a leadership position in the region. The Brazilian foreign ministry introduced a Competitive Import Substitution Programme (CISP) in 2005 with the “intent to substitute intra-continental products for extra-continental imports”. The approach was not to restrict extra-continental imports but rather to actively collect information that would enable firms in other South American countries to find potential customers in Brazil (Burghes, 2007: 1350). Information with this purpose in mind is collected in reports commissioned by the Brazilian government. One example is a report by FUNCEX on the highly asymmetrical trade relations between Brazil and the Andes countries. In this report, FUNCEX seeks to shed light on the possibilities and hindrances with regard to how to assure greater Brazilian exports from the Andes region from which Brazil imports relatively little and almost only from the energy sector (FUNCEX, 2006: 2-7). Similar reports have been made on the smaller countries in Mercosur. The CISP still has to prove its worth in terms of assuring a larger role for Brazil as an engine of economic growth as an importer. 
Nevertheless, Brazil performs this role in a more successful way as a provider of FDI in the region. In this area, as in the area of CISP, the approach of the Brazilian government combines actions by the public sector and the private sector. The most eloquent example of this is the IIRSA initiative that aims at improving the integration of South America through physical infrastructure projects in the area of transportation, energy and telecommunications (Burghes, 2007: 1350). The IIRSA initiative largely depends on private investments but is supported by government policy as well as by financing from the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) as well as from the development bank of the Andes Community (CAF) (Mercadante, 2006: 40). The initiatives of the Brazilian government and the interest of Brazilian foreign investors has led to an important expansion of Brazilian FDI in the region, but again, as the most industrially developed regional partners Argentina and Chile are the main beneficiaries (CNI, 2007: 20). However, Brazilian FDI in the region as a whole does form an important engine of regional economic growth for Brazil itself and for its South American partners. One example is the relations between Brazil and Peru, where Brazil has a great interest in promoting infrastructural connectivity as a way to gain better access to Asian export markets, while Peru’s government shares an interest in Brazilian infrastructure investments as well as investments and the expansion of bilateral trade (Durand, 2009). The same is true in Brazil’s relations with the two smallest Mercosur countries Paraguay and Uruguay (Christensen, 2007b). It is characteristic that there is a symbiosis between the initiatives of the Brazilian government and the initiatives of the Brazilian private sector towards the region. This symbiosis is at the core of the Brazilian approach to increasing its role as an engine of growth in the region and to making the region central in the promotion of national economic development.

Promoting institutionalism
Brazil has certainly been quite active in promoting regional institutions. As the analysis has shown, Brazil was a leading force in the formation of Mercosur and later in the promotion of a South American union that led to the formation of Unasur in 2007. Mercosur remains an inter-governmental institution as at the outset in 1991. According to Vigevani, Favaron, Ramanzini Júnior and Correia (2008) this largely reflects a Brazilian preference of being able to pursue its international strategies without constraints from supra-national institutions and rules at the regional level, a preference that is strongly held by private economic elites and reflects Brazil’s profile as a global trader. Although Unasur was initially intended to be constructed on the model of the EU, the reality today is that Unasur, like Mercosur, is an inter-governmental construct. This does not only reflect Brazilian preferences. The preference for an inter-governmental approach that maintains national sovereignty and veto power and thus a relatively shallow form of regional integration reflects, in my view, a widely shared preference for national self-determination in the region. It also can be seen as a logical consequence of the quite different foreign policies and national economic development policies pursued by the governments of South America, since this wide variance make it just about impossible to pursue deep integration in the region. 
Deep integration is not really Brazil’s aim with South American regionalism. The centrepiece of Unasur has been an emphasis on physical integration, an area in which all regions share interests in spite of their many differences in development strategies and interests. José Antonio Sanahuja (2009: 34-36) sees Unasur mainly as an example of political integration and not economic integration as it does emphasize trade rules as in the case of the “open regionalism” approach of Mercosur between 1991 and 2002. It represents a post-liberal form of regionalism in this sense Sanahuja argues, and he further points out that Unasur is largely a result of Brazil’s geopolitical strategy of redefining regionalism in terms of South America instead of Latin America, as Brazil finds that Mexico and Central America are increasingly tied to the United States. Lima (2009) describes Unasur as multifocal as opposed to the singular focus of Mercosur on trade in its initial period. Apart from its focus on physical integration, Unasur thus also focuses on cultural and social aspects as well as on regional security as reflected in Brazil’s successful promotion of a Regional Security Council of South America within Unasur. I find that the regional security dimension is a significant part of Brazil’s overall strategy of developing a leadership position for itself in the region and to use the region as a way to aggregate power and thereby also to increase its international political and economic clout. The key aspect of this strategy is to position Brazil as the leading state in South America and to reduce the influence of the United States in the region, I would argue. This strategy fits perfectly with the idea promoted by the Brazilian foreign ministry of promoting a multipolar world system in which South America should be one of the poles (Guimarães, 2006). 
In theoretical terms, neo-realism and inter-governmentalism seem to provide the best lenses from which to analyze what is going on. As Brazil’s strategy also relates strongly to the notion of geo-economics in the sense of the tendency for international power struggles to take place largely in terms of the struggle to position national economies in a competitive position internationally vis-a-vis competing nations, theoretical perspectives related to international economic interdependence could also be useful in analyzing Brazil’s regional role and its international political strategies. In the final part of the analysis of Brazil’s regional strategies, I move on to discuss how they relate to the wider international scene.  

Strategic aspects of regionalism in Brazil’s attempt at changing the global power balance
Regionalism at the level of Mercosur and South America can be seen as an attempt by Brazil to promote South America as a geopolitically relevant region and to gain leadership in this region. If successful, this strategy would prove to have significance both at the level of the regional balance of power in the Western Hemisphere and at the level of the international system where South America under Brazilian leadership would become a more significant player. From Brazil’s perspective South America therefore can be seen as a tool for Brazil to aggregate political power in the international system. As I have argued, South America is also seen as a way to strengthen the Brazilian economy and its international competitiveness. 
Brazil can be seen to promote the same logic to the wider international system through its approach to South-South relations. Here, Brazil has been promoting a highly activist agenda with a double focus. In the economic area, there has been a focus on diversifying trade links (Vigevani and Cepaluni, 2007) with a view of emphasizing trade links with the South and thereby reduce its dependence on the leading industrial countries. At the same time, the strategy has emphasized the formation of South-South coalitions such as the G20 that aims at reforming multilateral trade rules in the area of agriculture with a view of opening up the agricultural markets of leading industrial nations.
These initiatives should be seen as part of Brazil’s attempt at promoting the economic development of Brazil and of the developing and at the same time as a way to change the global power balance. By improving the competitiveness and relative economic weight of the South in the global economy through geo-economics, the global order and power balance would at the same time be affected and create a new geopolitical situation. Such a changed world order should open up for Brazil becoming accepted as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations, one of the main strategic emphases in the Lula government’s global strategy (Lima and Hirst, 2006).

Regional integration in East Asia
The East Asian integration project was originally initiated by Japan and could be dated back to the beginning of the 20th century. Japan made the first attempt to lead Asian countries before the Second World War. At that time, the Japanese Government embarked on a brutally expansionist policy the result of which was creation of the first gaggle of “flying geese” under the name of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” During the “flight” Japan militarily invaded and brutally ruled most of the countries in the region, and forcefully imposed its own worldviews and values on the rest of the region. At the same time, the Japanese Government assumed hostile attitude toward Western countries. Japan’s defeat in the Second World War signified the end of flight of the first “flying-geese” gaggle --- the end of the first phase of regional integration project.
After the war, Japan made another attempt at regional integration through establishing a production network in East Asia. Thus the second gaggle of “flying geese” came into existence. During the flight of the “second gaggle” of geese, Japan and the second flying layer of geese (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) became a member of the western blocs enjoying benefits from the US-led capitalist world system. This type of geopolitically-supported regional economic development came to an end following the end of the Cold War at the end of 1980s. Furthermore, the rapid emergence of China and the Asian economic crisis in 1997 not only interrupted the flight of the “second gaggle” but also started the global debates about the “Asian crony capitalism” and the “Asian values” (Fuller, 2000; Li, et al, 2002; ul Haq, 1998). 

The unique intra-regional economic relations in East Asia
The hypothesis of the flying-geese pattern suggests that a group of nations in this region are flying together in layers with Japan at the front layer. The layers signify the different stages of economic development achieved in various countries. In the flying-geese model of regional economic development, Japan as the leading goose leads the second-tier geese (less developed countries) which, in their turn, are followed by the third-tier geese (least developed countries). By a closer look, some unique characteristics of intra-regional dynamics can be analyzed from a number of inter-related and somehow overlapped types of economic relation:

1)	There emerged a ladder-type of intra-regional economic relations in the region, which was well formulated both in time and space. In terms of development level Japan always stood at the top ladder whereas the rest were followed at low or lower levels. In terms of industrial relations countries at the lower end of the ladder inherited the “left-over” from countries at the top of the ladder by overtaking their productions and importing their technologies. This kind of closely linked intra-regional economic structure also explains the reason why economic growth has been able to passed on in East Asia. This peculiar phenomenon has been possible because the region has continuously produced, but never simultaneously, new economic players in the world economy (Kim, 1991). Thus, we can observe the interesting fact that countries in this region are at different stages of economic development, but they all share some fundamentally identical path of economic development.
2)	During the first two phases of regional integration, Japan was the model for imitation for East Asian late-comers. They basically learned the development formula from Japan: low wages, good education and training, high saving rates and strong government guidance of the private economy. Historically, there have been three main elements in East Asian industrial development which were based on Japanese model. The first was the development of a highly competitive manufacturing sector. The second was the deliberate restructuring of industry toward higher value-added and high-productivity industries, and in the late 1980s, these were mainly knowledge-intensive tertiary industries. The third element was aggressive domestic and international business strategies. When Japan entered a later stage, it passed the earlier phase to the next Asian NIEs who, in turn, passed their earlier stages to other developing countries as they entered a higher level. 
3)	The intra-regional division of labour in East Asia was not only a part of larger global process of specialization (between Japan and the core states, and between Japan-the NIEs-the core states), but also a good example of regional labour division (Japan-the NIEs-China/AESEAN). The most interesting factor explaining the regional labour division is that in East Asia there are strong differences in the allocation of natural resources and industrial development level. Some industrially powerful countries are resource-poor ones. Some resource-rich countries are industrially weak. Even among the industrialized countries, some are relatively more advanced in the level of industrialization than others. Therefore, labour division in East Asia has been structured both vertically and horizontally. The vertical labour division explains that the advanced economies in this region are the host countries for technologies and high-tech industries, whereas the less developed economies are the suppliers of cheap labour and resources. The horizontal labour division indicates that the shedding effects from the advanced economies can be a great input to the less advanced economies in form of foreign direct investment, partial and gradual technology transfer and international subcontracting.
4)	The intra-regional division of labour also clearly manifests the “chain-pattern” intra-regional economic relations in East Asia, which reveal the structure of industrial production relations among countries in the region. The hypothesis of chain pattern indicates that many products are going through processing in a number of countries, and economies in the leading position will gradually move some of their industries or industrial sectors to the next layer of countries because of changing comparative advantage over time. However, it is necessary to point out that this pattern of economic development is largely centred on Japan and based on its production system. 
5)	Recent studies have indicated that intra-regional trade and interdependence and is intensifying. Although East Asian economies still rely on exports to the industrial countries as an important engine for growth, intra-regional trade and internal demand play an increasing role in their development. Domestic markets have been driven by the rapid growth in personal incomes and by needed infrastructure investments. If we look at the whole Asia-Pacific region, trade within the region has been increasing dramatically in comparison with other parts of the world. In 1992, the total US trade volume in the Asia-Pacific region reached $534 billion in which its trade with East Asia accounts for $348 billion. This was far more than the US trade with Canada and Mexico ($265 billion) and Europe ($227 billion) (Li, Changjiu, 1994:44). During the end of 1980s, 70 per cent of Asian NIEs’ export and 68 per cent of its import were conducted with the region. Similar indications of increasing intra-regional trade can be found with 72 per cent of ASEAN export and 63 per cent of its import; 62 per cent of Japan’s export and 57 per cent of its import; 46 per cent of the US export and 53 per cent of its import; 82 per cent of Canada’s export and 77 per cent of its import; China, whose total trade volume was $111.6 billion in 1989 in which its Asia-Pacific trade was 66 per cent of the total import volume and 75 per cent of the total export volume (Zhang, 1994: 25).
6)	Intra-regional investment in East Asia is also worthy of attention. According to the Asian Development Bank, FDI inflows into East Asia including Japan have more than quadrupled since 1980 and in 2004 FDI inflows in the region reached 21% as a share of world total. Over the same period, the share of East Asian FDI outflows also increased substantially from 5% to 14% of the world total (Kuroda, 2006: on-line). Intraregional FDI flows accounted for much of this increase. The Asian Development Bank data shows that the main sources of FDI in East and Southeast came from the region itself. Between 1986 and 1992, the four East Asian dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) were the largest single FDI sources for China, Indonesia and Malaysia; and they accounted for 48% of total FDI flows to ASEAN and China between 1990 and 2002 manifesting a mutually reinforcing relationship between the region’s FDI and trade (Kuroda, 2005: on-line).

China’s Development Strategies in Regional Integration
Following the economic reform started in China since the end of 1970s and China’s global emergence since the 1990s, East Asia witnessed a gradual shift away from the vertical “flying-geese” model of to a new horizontal modelling of regional economic integration driven and led by China as the engine of economic growth.
Taking China into consideration in the flying-geese pattern of intra-regional economic relations, one attention-grabbing point worth of mentioning is China’s production and labour relations with other Asian states. As it is mentioned before, the nation’s vast size and unbalanced development level between regions indicate that it is flying in different layers simultaneously and has multiple chain production and labour relations with many countries. This situation is obviously an advantage because it enables China to cooperate with other countries in almost all industrial sectors. On the one hand, China is capable of cooperating with Japan and the NIEs in developing high-tech industries while it can inherit labour-intensive industries from them. On the other hand, it can also export capital, intermediate products and some of its labour-intensive light industries to less developed countries in the region. Based on these closely linked economic relations, Chinese economy is increasingly integrated with the regional economy. “In contrast to the fears of China as an economic competitor, which dominated perceptions of China's role at the beginning of the modernization program, Asia-Pacific countries in general have found that they have successfully adjusted to China’s integration into the regional economic system without serious negative repercussions to them” (Morrison, 1992: 456).

Taking advantage of overseas Chinese diaspora in the region
One of China’s major assist The role of ethnic Chinese networks (Chinese Diaspora) has been significant in regional economic integration not only in terms of being the major source of FDI contributing to China’s economic growth but also in terms of being the network connector linking the Chinese market with the rest of the region (Peng, 2000). There is a consensus that overseas Chinese diasporas, whose economic power is greater than that of any other diasporas of any other states, are one of the main economic and financial resources for sustaining China’s economic growth and connecting China with the rest of the region since China started its economic reform at the end of 1970s. The overseas remittances and investments contributed by Chinese diasporas accounted for a substantial proportion of China’s growth. It is not an exaggeration to claim that Chinese Diasporas are a vital key to China’s economic success as well as to its further integration with regional and global economy.
The role of ethnic Chinese diaspora business networks has increasingly become an important integrative driving force in promoting regional economic integration not only in terms of being the major source of FDI contributing to China’s economic takeoff but also in terms of being the network connector linking the Chinese market with the rest of the region (Peng, 2000). A typical phenomenon is that many firms from the developed economies in the region use China as low-cost manufacturing based as well as an export base instead of directly exporting finished goods to the Western markets. By doing so they have moved their productions to China, further enhancing China’s integration in the regional economy and leading to the reorganization of industrial relations in East Asia. The key actors behind those firms in this process of economic regionalization are those ethnic Chinese firms and their business networks which act as sources of capital, technology and expertise and bring in business synergy between Mainland China and the rest of the region (Crawford, 2000). 
The spill-over effect of the regional network-based Chinese capitalism can be illustrated by the role of the hundreds of successful ethnic Chinese family business and networks connecting and interlocking medium-sized businesses in many countries in the region. Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, business executives, traders and financiers are the major players linking local economies with that of the region. Among the major actors, the Chinese-dominated regions such as Hong Kong and Taiwan have been playing a decisive role. Their capital, technology, entrepreneurial capability, marketing skills and international trading experience matched very well with the advantages of cheap land and abundant supply of low-priced disciplined labour in the mainland. Not only in China, ethnic Chinese are also major and sometimes prime sources of capital and entrepreneurship of most of the Southeast Asian countries.

Pushing a horizontal regional diversified economic relations
When global FDI began to horizontally spread to China and other East Asian countries, the early Japan-based flying-geese and ladder-patterned intra-regional industrial, trade and the linkages with global FDI was transformed into a relationship of competition in which countries in this region are competing with one another for capital and financial resources as well as for export market. It is often the fact that many enterprises and industries in the region are facing direct competition with Chinese products. To some scholars, the emergence of China’s economic strength was among the factors leading to the shift of financial and economic balance of power in the region, which partially contributed to the financial crisis in 1997 (Li, et al, 2002). 
The rise of China as a global manufacturing centre has a great impact on the traditional intra-regional economic relations and division of labour, leading to further specialization within various industries and to new divisions of labour both vertically and horizontally. Until the 1980s of the 20th century, trade in East Asia was patterned on the basis of “north-south trade” in line with comparative advantages - namely trade between industries. Since the 1990s, dramatic transformations took place in East Asian trade relations. Inter-industrial trade was gradually replaced by intra-industrial one which was based on vertical division of labour with a mixture of north-south and south-south relations.

Engine of economic growth
China’s economic power especial its growing domestic market has become an important force promoting regional economic cooperation and trade growth and spurring East Asian economic recovery. In Northeast Asia, Japan has acknowledged that its recent economic recovery has been due in a large part to its massive exports to the Chinese market shifting its traditional trade deficit to surplus. Japan has remained China’s largest trading partner and import source as well as third largest export market for 10 consecutive years. First time in history China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) surpassed the US and became Japan’s largest trading partner in 2007.  For South Korea, China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) already became its top export market in 2003.
The financial crisis in 1997 had substantially deteriorated the regional economy, and the region recognized the fact that it was China, not the United States or Japan, that played the most important role in the region’s economic recovery. During the crisis China refused to devaluate its currency, instead, it drew on its extensive foreign exchange reserves to assist distressed nations. In addition, China refused to withhold its committed aid to Asian nations that tried to put their vulnerable economies in shape. 
In Southeast Asia, bilateral trade volume between China and nations in this region has reached 40 billion US dollars a year and the region’s exports to China are bigger than those to any other place in the world. Chinese statistics show that from 1990 to 2005, China-ASEAN trade volume surged at an average of 22% on year-on-year basis, four percentage points higher than the growth rate of China’s overall foreign trade volume in the corresponding period. In 2006 China-ASEAN trade reached $160.8 billion, a 23.4% increase comparing with the 2005 figures (Xu, 2006). Currently China and ASEAN are each other’s fourth largest trading partners and trade experts estimate that China-ASEAN trade may reach the $200 billion target by 2008 (People Daily online, October 30, 2006). China and ASEAN countries have been committed to the goal of establishing a free trade area by 2010 as scheduled - ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The rise of China changed the East and Southeast regional landscape in two ways. On the one hand, China’s new role as a link in the production network contributed to the growth of intra-regional trade. On the other hand, China became an active player in developing institutional frameworks to promote regional integration. 

Economic complementarities between China and the region
A positive integration trend led by China-driven regional economic growth is confirmed by a research on the spill-over effort on the economic growth in the home country generated by openness, market size, and level of development of neighbouring countries in the same region. The conclusion of the study verifies such an effect described by a scholar that “the economies of countries near large and open economies grow faster. Also, the level of development of neighbouring economies, especially when they are open, has significant positive spill-over effects” (Vamvakidis, 1998:265). For example, according to the study by Gaulier (et al, 2005), the China-centered economic regionalism can be seen from the reorganization of production in East Asia in which a triangular trade pattern emerges in such a way that companies of advanced economies use China as “an export base” (exporting intermediate goods to their affiliates in different regions in China rather than directly exporting finished products to the US and Europe markets), increasing the US and European trade deficits with China whereas decreasing their deficits with Japan and the newly industrializing economies. This means that China has been enjoying a large surplus in its trade with the United States and the EU, whereas China has trade deficits with most Asian countries. China’s import is helping to fuel the economic recovery and growth of its smaller neighbours.

Promoting institutionalism 
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 played also a role in pushing the region into forming trade and financial agreement in one way or another. Since then, the ten ASEAN countries have initiated a regular series of meetings at the cabinet and head-of-government levels with their counterparts from Japan, China, and Korea. These meetings are held at a yearly basis with two parallel structures: ASEAN10+1 (ASEAN 10 countries + China) and ASEAN10+3 (ASEAN 10 countries + China, South Korea and Japan) including annual meetings of the ASEAN ministers of foreign affairs, trade, investment and finance. 
China and ASEAN countries have been committed to the goal of establishing a free trade area by 2010 as scheduled - ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The rise of China changed the East and Southeast regional landscape in two ways. On the one hand, China’s new role as a link in the production network contributed to the growth of intra-regional trade. On the other hand, China became an active player in developing institutional frameworks to promote regional integration. In October 2009, China, Japan and Korea are seriously considering to institutionalize their economic cooperation in the form of free trade.

Chinese currency as a potential integrative element
The rise of China’s indispensable role in regional integration in East Asia can be reflected more eminently by the rising influence of the Chinese Yuan. East Asia is the region where the US Dollar has traditionally been the foreign exchange reserve for most countries. China is not only moving slowly to diversify its own foreign reserve currencies by increasing the Euro reserves but also “is seeking a possible and rational attempt to decouple Asian currencies from the dollar” (d'Orlando, 2009). Since last year China has signed a few deals with a number of countries, including South Korea, Malaysia and most recently Argentina, for currency swaps that would introduce the Chinese currency – Chinese Yuan, also known as the Renminbi, into foreign banking systems. That would allow foreign companies to make payments for Chinese exports in yuan, bypassing the US dollar. Soon Beijing will also increase the quota and allow foreigners to invest in yuan-based assets and financial products. The outcome is expected to bolster foreigners’ willingness and confidence in holding the Chinese Yuan.
In the past decade China is taking steady initiatives to use the Chinese Yuan to settle trade accounts between some Chinese provinces and neighboring states, starting with Hong Kong, and to the make yuan as loans and investments in the region. The Chinese State Council indicated that members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations now could use Yuan in their trade with China’s southeastern provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan. Although the Chinese Yuan has net yet become an official exchange current for most countries in the region due to the fact that is not fully convertible in the global financial market, it has already become a de facto “Asian Yuan” accepted by many countries in the purchase of commodities and services especially in the regional tourist market. 

Strategic aspects of regionalism in China’s attempt at changing the global power balance
One of China's strategies in promoting East Asian regional integration is to use the regional free trade agreement to reduce its long-term dependency on the US and EU markets. The US and EU have not recognized China as a "market economy". Just recently the US announced protectionist measures again China's tyre and seamless steel products while the EU also recently initiated protectionist tariff against Chinese footwear products. All these trade disputes with western markets have pushed China to look for alternative markets, and therefore, regional economic integration in East Asia including Southeast Asia is obviously a ideal project for China.
Another strategy of China aims to play a leadership role in the region's financial integration. It is already for sure that China will replace Japan as the world's second largest economy and assume the role of the dominant economy in the region. China will become a more important destination for Asian products than Japan eventually; this transformation assigns a special role to the Chinese currency. Although Chinese Yuan will unlikely play a dominant role immediately, but a historical comparative studies on the process of European monetary integration suggests designing a system where the relative weight of the Chinese Yuan increases gradually.
Moreover, China intends to use regional integration to compete with the US and Japan for a hegemonic position in East Asia. China's active role in regional integration will reduce the fear of small neighbouring countries, further promoting China's soft power and building a friendly political environment. 

Conclusion
Compared with Latin America/South America, regional integration in East Asia started much earlier and the process was remembered as one that was full of both suffering and brutality and rapid economic take-off and prosperity. Generally speaking intra-regional economic relations are more significant in East Asia than in South America and East Asia enjoys economic complementarities intra-regionally, whereas economic complementarities are at a low level in South America. The main problem in South America is to assure the sharing of benefits from regional integration, as the less developed countries find it difficult to gain market shares in the region. On the other hand, Brazilian governmental strategies and private sector FDI orientations tend to lead to growing Brazilian investments in the region, thereby improving the perception of the relevance of the region in less developed countries. In this way, Brazil is slowly gaining a more important role as an engine of economic growth in the region, although its imports from the region are still at a quite low level in spite of government-directed attempts at increasing imports from the region.
In East Asia, the Chinese diaspora plays a significant role in regional integration by means of their heavy investment activity throughout the region. There is no significant parallel to this in the case of South America, where intra-regional FDI is driven by the more developed countries’ private sectors, but is at a lower level than in East Asia. Similarly, whereas the Chinese Yuan is starting to play a financial role in East Asia, the Brazilian Real has not gained this role yet. The first sign of its relevance can be seen, though, in the recent decision between Argentina and Brazil to carry out mutual trade in their own currencies.
Both Brazil and China promote institutionalism in their respective regions. In both areas the focus has been on trade relations and deeper political involvement has been largely avoided in both regions, although Mercosur is an international political player with legal personality in the international system. Recently, the political aspect has been enhanced in South America with the creation of the South American defence council and similar developments can be seen in East Asia, although this is a recent development. The regions seem to be taking on larger roles in the respective global strategies of Brazil and China, both as a way for these countries to aggregate economic and international political power and as a way to challenge the hegemony of the United States, at least by promoting themselves as regional hegemonic powers in their respective regions. It seems, though, that there is a shared interest between Brazil and China in promoting a multipolar world order and to balance US power in ways other than traditional military ways and at the same time to construct regional security structures that do not depend on the United States. The growing economic weight of particularly China, but also of Brazil and other big emerging economies, as well as the rising political influence of such countries and the economic crisis suffered by the United States and other leading industrial economies seem to point in the direction of a less unbalanced world economy and in the direction of a change in the global political balance of power that would strengthen both China and Brazil. While this is a tendency, the fact that emerging great powers such as China and Brazil are seeking to promote such a change in global power balances makes such a development even more likely. 
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